Author: Stefan Kaufmann

Talk of interest on 11/21: Vann McGee

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Please join us for the (short) Award Ceremony and McGee’s lecture in BUSN 127, this Friday at 2 p.m. Contact Stefan Kaufmann for zoom information.

Vann McGee (M.I.T.):
“Terrestrial Logic”

We explore a “rules-of-inference first” methodology for logical theory. Instead of starting with truth conditions and looking for truth-preserving rules, we start out with the rules and set out to find appropriate truth conditions. We reach the conclusion that the classical rules pin down the semantic values of the logical words – “or,” “not,” “for all,” and so on – precisely. Inasmuch as, at least outside pure mathematics, human language and thought are saturated through and through with vagueness, this is, I think, a surprising outcome.

Friday, November 21, 2:00 – 4:00 p.m.

Talk of interest on 11/14: John Mackay

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This Friday’s Logic Colloquium:

John Mackay (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
“Counterparts and Tolerance”
Friday, November 14, 2-4pm
Hybrid: MCHU 202 & Zoom

Contact Stefan Kaufmann for zoom access information.

Abstract:
One motivation for counterpart theory comes from a family of puzzles about identity and modal variation known as puzzles of tolerance. In these puzzles, an object could have been slightly different but could not have been radically different. It is commonly assumed, both by counterpart theorists and their critics, that the counterpart-theoretic solution to the puzzles of tolerance involves the intransitivity of counterpart relations. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake, and instead I defend a solution to the puzzles of tolerance that involves transitive counterpart relations with context-sensitive names and variables.

Talk of interest on 05/02: Yasutada Sudo

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The last Logic Colloquium of the semester will be held on Friday, May 2, 2:30pm in MONT 420 (with a hybrid option; contact Stefan Kaufmann for the zoom link). The speaker is Yasutada Sudo from University College, London.

 

 Specific indefinites and dynamic presuppositions

This is an attempt to explain the exceptional scope behavior of specific indefinites in terms of ‘dynamic presuppositions’—presuppositions with anaphoric content in addition to propositional content. It is also claimed that puzzling interpretive properties of ‘certain’ indefinites are straightforwardly explained as dynamic presuppositions with functional anaphora.

Talk of interest on 04/25: WooJin Chung

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We will have a Logic Colloquium this Friday, April 25, 2:30pm in MONT 420 (with a hybrid option). The speaker is WooJin Chung from Seoul National. Title and abstract below. Contact Stefan Kaufmann for the zoom link.

 

Comparing conditionals under uncertainty
Suppose that Adam is a risk-taker—in general a highly successful one—and Bill prefers to play it safe. You believe that the organization is highly likely to thrive under Adam’s leadership, though there is still a small chance his investment could fail. On the other hand, Bill’s risk-averse strategy will allow the organization to profit to some degree, but it won’t be nearly as successful as in Adam’s best-case—and most likely—scenario. Yet the organization will fare better than Adam’s worst-case—and fairly unlikely—scenario. The following example sounds true in this context:
(1) If Adam takes the lead, the organization will be more successful than (it will be) if Bill takes the lead.
In this talk, I point out that the truth conditions of (1) do not align with the prediction of the standard quantificational view of conditionals (Kratzer 2012), coupled with extant theories on the interaction between comparatives and quantifiers (Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002, Heim 2006, Schwarzschild 2008, Beck 2010, among many others). I suggest that a working solution can be developed by dropping the assumption that conditionals are quantifiers over possible worlds.