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Talk of interest on 10/25: Paul Portner

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The Linguistics Colloquium on October 25 will feature Paul Portner (Georgetown University). Details as follows:

Friday Oct. 25 (4-6 pm), in person at SHH112.

Title: The Semantics of Profane Quasi-Verbs: Social Relations in a Dynamic Framework

Abstract

Though profane imprecations like F*** you! have received no attention in formal semantics, we might expect our theory of linguistic meaning to have something to say about such common expressions. In this talk, I discuss the nature of the meanings of profane quasi-verbs (Quang 1971) that function syntactically like f*** in the example above, and I provide a formal model that can account for some important aspects of their meaning and conversational use. This analysis throws light on the role of social relations in semantics and pragmatics.

 

Talk of interest on 10/25: Nicole Cruz

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This week’s Logic Colloquium:
Nicole Cruz (University of Potsdam)
Friday, October 25, 2:00-3:30pm
SHH 110 & Zoom
Disentangling conditional dependencies
(joint work with Michael Lee)
Abstract: People draw on event co-occurrences as a foundation for causal and scientific inference, but in which ways can events co-occur? Statistically, one can express a dependency between events A and C as P(C|A) != P(C), but this relation can be further specified in a variety of ways, particularly when A and/or C are themselves conditional events. In the psychology of reasoning, the conditional P(C|A) is often thought to become biconditional when people add the converse, P(A|C), or inverse, P(not-C|not-A), or both, with the effects of these additions largely treated as equivalent. In contrast, from a coherence based logical perspective it makes a difference whether the converse or the inverse is added, and in what way. In particular, the addition can occur by forming the conjunction of two conditionals, or by merely constraining their probabilities to be equal. Here we outline four distinct ways of defining biconditional relationships, illustrating their differences by how they constrain the conclusion probabilities of a set of inference forms. We present a Bayesian latent-mixture model with which the biconditionals can be dissociated from one another, and discuss implications for the interpretation of empirical findings in the field.
Join Zoom Meeting:
Meeting ID: 997 3571 5427
Passcode: 18481108

Talk of interest on 08/30: Fabrizio Cariani (UMD)

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The Logic Colloquium will feature a talk by Fabrizio Cariani (UMD Philosophy):

Fabrizio Cariani (UMaryland):
“Anankastic conditionals and the reason-based analysis of deontic modals”
Friday, August 30, 2:00-3:30pm
Hybrid: Herbst (formerly Oak) 110 & Zoom
Abstract: I identify and develop a solution to the puzzle of anankastic conditionals that is novel in the sense that it has gone largely unnoticed, but also well-worn in that the materials for it have long been available. The solution involves an integration of the classical Kratzerian premise semantics and a default theory of reasons (such as the one presented in Horty, 2012, leveraging several decades of research on default logic). To stress-test the proposal I also investigate how it might be applied to the variety of anankastic-adjacent data discussed by Condoravdi and Lauer (2016). The resulting approach is not just an exceptional fit for the problem of anankastic conditionals, but also an independently promising upgrade on the classical account of modals.
Contact the organizers for zoom login information.

Meeting on 2/28: Larson 2024

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The Meaning Group will meet on Wednesday, February 28, 11:00-12:00 in Herbst 338. Yusuke Yagi will lead a discussion of the paper below.

Larson, R. 2024. Quantification, matching and events. Natural Language Semantics.

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11050-023-09216-x

 

Talk of interest on 10/27: Dorr and Mandelkern

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Logic Colloquium talk this week

Cian Dorr and Matthew Mandelkern (NYU Philosophy)

“The Logic of Sequences”

Friday, October 27, 2:00pm – 3:30pm

hybrid: ROWE 320 and Zoom (link below)

 

Abstract:

In the course of proving a tenability result about the probabilities of conditionals, van Fraassen (1976) introduced a semantics for conditionals based on sequences of worlds, representing a particularly simple special case of ordering semantics for conditionals. According to sequence semantics, ‘If p, then q’ is true at a sequence just in case either q is true at the first truncation of the sequence where p is true, or there is no truncation where p is true. This approach has become increasingly popular in recent years. However, its logic has never been explored. We axiomatize the logic of sequence semantics, showing that it is the result of adding two new axioms to Stalnaker’s logic C2: one which is prima facie attractive, and one which is complex and difficult to assess.  We also show that when sequence models are generalized to allow transfinite sequences, the result is the logic that adds only the first (more attractive) axiom to C2.

 

 

Talk of interest on 10/25: M. Kaufmann

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The Philosophy Brownbag on Wednesday, October 25, at12:15pm will feature our own Magdalena Kaufmann with a talk titled Conjunctions (in)forming Conditionals. The meeting is hybrid, in-person in the basement lounge of Manchester Hall and online via Zoom. Contact Stefan Kaufmann for login information.

Abstract: In many natural languages (including English), sentential conjunctions instantiating the schema `p and q’ can receive conditional interpretations similar to `if p, then q’ (“conditional conjunctions”). Empirical evidence from several languages suggests that this interpretation comes about when the first sentential conjunct is marked or interpreted as a topic. While this allows for a compositional interpretation of the phenomenon, it does not in itself explain puzzling restrictions on the kinds of conditional meanings that can be expressed by conjunctions: conditional conjunctions cannot normally be used to express generalizations and to make predictions about future sequences of events (roughly, generic and causal-like/metaphysical conditionals), but not to express epistemic conditionals (roughly, reasoning under uncertainty about current and past states of affairs). Special discourse settings can, however, overwrite this restriction and make conditional conjunctions felicitous as epistemic conditionals.